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Abstract
While most security projects have focused on fending off attacks coming from outside the organizational bound-
aries, a real threat has arisen from the people who are inside those perimeter protections. Insider threats have shown
their power by hugely affecting national security, financial stability, and the privacy of many thousands of people.
What is in the news is the tip of the iceberg, with much more going on under the radar, and some threats never
being detected. We propose a hybrid framework based on graphical analysis and anomaly detection approaches, to
combat this severe cyber security threat. Our framework analyzes heterogeneous data in isolating possible malicious
users hiding behind others. Empirical results reveal this framework to be effective in distinguishing the majority of
users who demonstrate typical behavior from the minority of users who show suspicious behavior.
I. Introduction
The battle between malicious but trusted insiders and organizations in safeguarding information assets is the
biggest and fastest growing cyber security threat in this digital age. Insider threat, or the threat from a malicious
insider who is defined as “a current or former employee, contractor or business partner who has, or had, authorized
access to an organization’s network, system or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner
that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the organization’s information or information
systems” [7] has been identified as a primary concern within the cybersecurity community. Financial loss and
reputation damage caused by this “known unknown” cybersecurity threat far outweighs that caused by external
attacks. Thus, the majority of private and governmental organizations have identified the severity of the threat
posed by insiders and focused on security control improvements. However, the seriousness of this problem is still
rising at an alarming rate threatening most critical infrastructure segments.
One of the most recent articles from CSO magazine [1] compared the cost between external and internal attacks
and noted that while it takes about 50 days to fix a data breach caused by an internal attack, it only takes 2 to 5
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2days in the case of external attacks. Moreover, “attacks by malicious insiders are also the costliest to fix ($145,000),
followed by denial of service ($127,000) and Web-based attacks ($96,000)”, indicating the severity of this problem.
The unpredictable nature of human behavior makes this complex issue much more complicated than expected.
This is aggravated by the mobility and hyper-connectivity of people. Insider threat research and surveys suggest this
problem cannot be considered only as a data driven problem; it needs to be considered as data and behavior driven
problem [5]. A close examination of user behavior can spot trends and such information can be used in tightening
radars on suspicious users. Different parameters govern users’ day to day actions, and behavioral changes exposed
in workplace environments will extend the possibilities of isolating suspicious users from the rest of the employees.
Organizations can suffer after effects such as unmotivated employees, inefficient work behavior, if an innocent user
is classified as suspicious. Thus, the decision of naming a person as suspicious should be a smooth but complex
process. Obviously, insider threat detection will focus on isolating suspicious users from the others; but it may not
be practical to point an employee as a malicious attacker. Also, the effectiveness of the process totally depends on
the ability of analysis of many parameters as possible. Consideration of above facts led us to think of an insider
threat detection framework as described in the rest of the paper.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we propose a framework for isolation of malicious users based on graphical
and anomaly detection techniques. The proposed architecture is given in Figure 1, and has two major components
“Graphical Processing Unit” (GPU) and “Anomaly Detection Unit” (ADU). Data from multidimensional sources of
an enterprise network is formatted and fed into the GPU, which generates a graph which represents interrelationships
between informational assets of the network. These input streams can be from different, i.e., heterogeneous,
informational sources with different data formats. These data streams can be from event logs (logon/logoff), email
logs, HTTP records, social network access data and various HR records such as psychometric data. Once the
informational assets are mapped into a network, several graph parameters are calculated for each user. Since the
final goal is to isolate the most anomalous users from the rest, all the attributes are computed for individual users.
The next task of the GPU is to generate induced subgraphs of each user for different levels of neighborhoods. Several
relevant subgraph properties (vertex count, edge count, density, diameter and number of peers) are calculated for
each level of subgraphs. Calculated graph and subgraph parameters are fed into the ADU. In parallel to the above
process, time-varying data also fed into the ADU. The isolation forest algorithm is executed for isolating anomalous
users within the ADU unit. Anomaly scores for each user is generated as the output of the ADU. These values are
used in identifying and separating possible malicious users from the rest of the workforce.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes mostly related work contributed to
insider threat detection research. Section 3 is the dataset we used in this research while section 4 described the
adopted methodology. Experimental results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper indicating
conclusions and future directions.
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II. Related Work
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based approaches, visualization strategies, honeypot/honeynet approaches and
system call based methods are several techniques adopted from external threat detection in finding solutions for
insider problem [17]. The work presented here is focused on the combination of graph-based techniques and
anomaly detection approaches. This section will only discuss the most related work under the above two techniques
specifically in the insider threat domain.
The specialized network anomaly detection (SNAD) model proposed by [6] is a graph based approach used for
detecting insider actions in collaborative information systems. In their model access logs are mapped into a bipartite
graph. The similarity of users are compared based on the number of subjects a user accesses from a collaborative
information system using the cosine similarity measure. In order to determine if a particular access is anomalous
or not, the authors considered the influence of a user on the similarity of the access network by suppressing each
user at a time. Even though they achieved better performance over their competitors (spectral anomaly detection
model), they identified difficulties in implementation on real world networks.
Another study [4] proposed a proactive insider threat detection by graph learning and psychological modeling
of users. The proposed model is a combination of structural anomaly detection and psychological profiling and
4explored the possibility of including dynamical properties of nodal attributes. They have evaluated results based on
a publicly available gaming data set which might not be very similar to enterprise system and network data. Althebyn
and Panda [2] have also suggested the use of graph theory to formalize two components, knowledge graph and
object dependency graphs. A knowledge graph represents knowledge units for a given insider and they are updated
over the time. Dependency graph is a global hierarchical graph that shows all dependencies among various objects.
Even though this model tries to include accumulated knowledge of the insider over time on systems and objects it
can be improved by including several other parameters such as user’s behavioral patterns and psychological aspects.
Another study performed by Nance and Marty [12] introduced the use of bipartite graphs for identifying and
visualizing insider threat. They tried to establish acceptable insider behavior patterns based on workgroup role
classifications. Although this approach is quite useful for detecting certain insider threats, it has the limitation of
a high false positive rate. The framework suggested by [8] is another graph-based approach for malicious insider
threat detection which uses the minimum description length principle for detecting anomalous activities. A recent
paper [10] proposed the use of authentication subgraphs for analyzing users behavior within an enterprise network
utilizing a set of subgraph attributes in user profiling. Time series analysis of subgraphs and use of bipartite graphs
are also introduced in their work, targeting on a much comprehensive analysis in their ongoing work. Another
related framework, the BANDIT (Behavioral Anomaly Detection for Insider Threat) [3] also proposed a two-stage
anomaly detection approach in managing insider attacks which compared user’s behaviour based on own and peer
baselines.
III. The Data Set
Due to the lack of availability of proper insider threat datasets we have utilized the insider threat dataset published
by CERT Carnegie Mellon University for this research [15]. The dataset “R4.2.tar.bz” has been used for this analysis.
According to the dataset owners, this is a “dense needle” dataset with a fair amount of red team scenarios. This
dataset consists of six broad types of data records (HTTP, logon, device, file, email and psychometric) of 1000
employees over a 17 months period. All HTTP records contain user, PC, URL and web page content with time
stamps. “Logon.csv” consists of user logon/logoff activities with the corresponding PC with timestamps. “Logon”
and “Logoff” are the two types of activities can be found in data records. “Logon” activity corresponds to either
a user login event or a screen unlock event, while the “Logoff” event corresponds to user logoff event. Screen
locks are not recorded in this dataset. The third data file “device.csv” is a collection of data records of removable
media usage. It indicates insert/remove actions with the relevant user, PC, and timestamp. Details of file copies are
stored in “file.csv” file with date, user, PC, filename, and content. To get the friendship network of users, the CERT
dataset provides email communication records including from, to, cc and bcc fields. “psychometric.csv” provides
psychometric scores based on big five personality traits or five-factor model (FFM) for the definition of personality.
Among the different work roles which in the dataset, we performed our analysis with three job roles. Table 1
shows the statistics of selected data records.
5TABLE I
DATA STATISTICS
Functional Unit Department Number
of Users
HTTP Logon Device File Psychometric
Research And Engineering Engineering 129 4,196,817 101,782 67,916 75,335 129
Research And Engineering Software Management 101 3,295,774 82,187 44,049 58,173 101
Research And Engineering Research 101 3,332,576 79,362 30,906 41,292 101
IV. Methodology
The goal of this paper is to introduce a framework for mitigating the insider threat problem using a combination of
graph-based approach and an anomaly detection technique. This framework will utilize multidimensional inputs such
as user interactions with hardware assets, web access records, email correspondences and psychometric figures. The
graph-based approach is a prominent method of identifying inter-relationships between multidimensional entities. A
user’s interactions with devices are illustrated in a weighted, undirected large scale bipartite graph G = (V,E,W ),
where V is the set of vertices (users), E is the set of edges, and W is the set of edge weights. Set of vertices
comprises of two types of entities, users and devices while edges represent user’s interaction with the device. Edge
weights correspond to the number of “Logoff” activities which appeared during the whole time duration of the
dataset between an individual user and a device. Graph visualization was carried out using NodeXL [14] and all the
other calculations were done using the R statistical computing language [13]. The following subsections describe
the theoretical background and the implemented methodology in detail.
Even though the dataset comprises of both “logon” and “logoff” records for individual users, we utilize only
the “logoff” events for network mapping. The reason behind this is that we cannot distinguish logon activities,
and screen unlocks as they both recorded as “logon” events. However, the screen locks are not recorded, and only
the logoff events are recorded as “logoff” events. The representation of the use of removable media also can be
represented by an edge between the corresponding user and the device. However, this will convert the graph into
a multigraph where the existence of multiple edges is possible among two vertices. To keep the simplicity of the
first phase of analysis, we shall exclude the representation of such edges. Integration of the friendship network into
the same network would change the structure of the network, and it will lose the multipartite property. Therefore,
inter-user relationships based on email data has not been considered for graphical representation. The following
graph attributes for individual users are captured from the above graph G for further analysis.
IV-A. Graph Parameters
User’s vertex degree (du): The degree of a vertex is the number of edges connected to it. In the context of
this analysis, we calculated the degree only for the users. Therefore this value represents the number of devices
accessed by an individual user.
6IV-B. User Subgraph (USG) Parameters
Fig. 2. First order subgraph topology for all users
As the next step of the analysis, the focus is on the construction of subgraphs for each user. A deep dive into
the different order of subgraphs is how we extract relevant graph parameters in graph analysis. In this work user
subgraphs are constructed until the fifth order of neighborhood. We define the user sub-graph (USG) as a weighted
undirected graph Gu = (Vu, Eu,Wu) for the entire period of the dataset. Vu represents the vertex set of Gu while
Eu represents the edge set of Gu. Link weights are similar to that of the original graph. We have noticed that all
the first order subgraphs have a star topology as shown in Figure 2. The number of external nodes can be within
(1 : total number of devices). This factor is because of the disjoint nature of the two type of vertices. Even though
we cannot extract much information on device access similarities with first order subgraphs, we will continue to
use following subgraph properties of first order subgraphs in addition to the higher order subgraph properties for
the completeness of this analysis.
1) Vertex count vuj for j = 1 : 5
2) Edge count euj for j = 1 : 5
3) Density puj for j = 1 : 5
The density of a graph is the ratio of edges to all possible edges given the number of vertices.
4) Diameter duj for j = 1 : 5
The diameter of a graph is the largest shortest path between any two vertices.
5) Number of peers puj for j = 1 : 5
Since the main focus of this analysis is to identify the most anomalous users, we have chosen this parameter
for evaluation in addition to the basic graph properties.
7The distribution of the above properties has been illustrated as histograms and further discussed in the “Experi-
mental Results” section of this paper.
IV-C. Time Dependent Parameters
We believe that it is not sufficient to consider only the above parameters in identifying malicious insiders without
the temporal properties. To carry out a complete and comprehensive analysis, the following time-based parameters
and personality values have been identified as important input parameters for the anomaly detection algorithm.
IV-C1. Individual logon logoff events. This parameter can be used in identifying users abnormal logon/logoff
activities as most disgruntled insiders tend to commit malicious activities after hours [5]. Identifying users’ baseline
behavior on system/device access is an essential part of malicious insider threat detection problem. For each user,
four parameters (minimum, maximum, mean and mode) logon and logoff values have been calculated. Those four
parameters are also fed as an input parameters to the anomaly detection unit.
IV-C2. Removable media usage events. Removable media is among the most popular method used in theft of
Intellectual Property (IP) in extracting confidential information from organizations [5]. Tracking the use of removable
media can be an excellent information source for identifying suspicious events by trusted insiders . Baseline behavior
of removable media usage is captured by the minimum, maximum, mean and mode time of “Insert” and “Remove”
activities as in the logon/logoff event analysis. Time gap between consecutive “Insert - Remove” action has also
been identified as a good source of information to capture large file downloads. The daily number of files copied
by an individual is also used in this analysis.
IV-C3. Web Access Patterns. We can think of users’ online behavior as a reflection of their offline behavior, as
they tend to publish their feelings, thoughts, likes and dislikes through social media. In addition to the above fact,
web access patterns is also a good indication of their online behavior. Disgruntled insiders tend to access competitors
websites and recruitment agency websites to understand and gather information on potential opportunities. We have
identified that the users online behavior analysis will be comprehensive if we include multiple social media data
sources and web access records. However due to the limitations of data availability on all these domains we will
be strict only to web access records for this research work. Also, it is evident that the content of web pages may
have a direct link with users suspicious behavior. However, we will again restrict content analysis of web pages in
this analysis and will consider it as a future direction of our continuing work.
IV-D. Personality Parameters
Psychometric data : Psychological behavior is one of the other aspects linked to insider attacks. Sudden behavioral
changes can be indications of misuse of privileges. Verbal behavior, personality traits, unauthorized absences,
aggressive behavior, are a few indicators which can be considered as small markers which come before the big
attack. Therefore nontechnical behavioral changes are captured through the psychometric data provided in the
8TABLE II
SELECTED PARAMETER SET
Module Parameter
Graph Degree of vertex
Sub Graphs
Vertex Count
Edge Count
Density
Weighted Diameter
Number of Peers
Logon/Logoff
Events
Minimum/Maximum Logon Time
Mean/Mode Logon Time
Minimum/Maximum Logoff Time
Mean/Mode Logoff Time
Removable Media
Minimum/Maximum Insert Time
Mean/Mode Insert Time
Minimum/Maximum Remove Time
Mean/Mode Remove Time
Maximum number of daily file copies
Mode of number of daily file copies
Web Access Patterns Number of Unique URLs
Psychometric
Observations
O (Openness to experience)
C (Conscientiousness)
E (Extroversion)
A (Agreeableness)
N (Neuroticism)
dataset.
Table 2 is a summary of all properties we have identified in this analysis to consider as input parameters in to
the isolation forest algorithm to separate most anomalous users. Due to space limitations, we have listed some pairs
of parameters in the same line in the table, e.g., the line ”Minimum/Maximum Insert Time” covers two parameters,
”Minimum Insert Time”, and ”Maximum Insert Time”.
IV-E. Anomaly Detection
Due to the complex nature of insider threat problem, it is extremely hard to pinpoint a user as a malicious
insider. Therefore, the first step should be the identification of possible malicious insiders who are maximally
deviating from peers as well as their normal behavior. Therefore, as the second stage of our analysis, we will focus
on implementing an anomaly detection algorithm based on the important graphical properties and time dependent
9TABLE III
SUMMARY OF NUMBER OF PARAMETERS
Property Number of Input parameters
Graph properties 1
Sub graph properties 25
Logon/Logoff behavior 8
Removable media usage 10
Web access patterns 1
Psychometric observations 5
properties identified at the previous stage of this analysis. The anomaly detection algorithm adopted in this analysis
is the “Isolation forest” algorithm, which stands out in effectively separating anomalous events from the rest of the
instances [11].
Isolation Forest Algorithm - iForest: The isolation forest algorithm is a model-based approach which explicitly
isolates anomalies without constructing a typical profile instance. Linear time complexity with a low constant and
low memory requirements drives us to use it in our experiments as the enormous amount of information need to be
analyzed in the field of insider threat. The use of the isolation forest algorithm for this work is part of the overall
research effort within our research group at RMIT University and CA Pacific, with the details as presented in [16],
where it is applied to a very large enterprise system for anomaly detection.
This algorithm also performs well with a large number of irrelevant attributes and instances where training data
set does not contain any anomalies. This method generates an ensemble of iTrees for a given dataset and the
instances with the short average path of iTrees are considered to be anomalies. If the calculated anomaly score
value, s is very close to 1 it can be regarded as a definite anomaly. Instances with s much smaller than 0.5 can be
considered normal situations. If all the instances return s ≈ (0.5), then the entire sample deemed to be not having
any distinct anomalies.
Based on the above-described algorithm, anomaly scores were calculated for each user, for each order of subgraph
for (1:5) separately, based on the five graph properties identified in subsection 4.2. In this case the iForest algorithm
is executed considering 5 input parameters. We believe it would be much effective if we incorporate parameter
values calculated for the different order of subgraphs when calculating anomaly scores. Therefore anomaly scores
corresponding to subgraph properties have been computed using 25 distinct values obtained for 5 various parameters
of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4thand 5th order of subgraphs. Similarly, anomaly scores correspond to graph parameters, time-
dependent parameters and personality parameters (as summarized in Table 2) were calculated independently using
iForest algorithm. Finally, anomaly scores correspond to each user is calculated as a combination of all the parameters
described in Table 2, in which case the number of input parameters for the algorithm was 50. Breakdown of the
number of parameters has been summarized in Table 3.
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V. Experimental Results
This section is dedicated to a comprehensive discussion of results obtained through our analysis. The discussion is
based on the “Research and Engineering/Engineering” work role, and final results for all three work roles considered
in this analysis are summarized in Table 4.
Figure 3 is an illustration of the user’s device access network. Users are represented in spheres while devices are
represented by triangles. Vertex size corresponds to the degree of the vertex, which is an indication of the number
of devices accessed by a particular user. The width of all edges corresponds to the number of “Logoff” events which
occurred during the entire period of the dataset. We continue to use the graphical representation of informational
assets as in our previous work [9], as it can be used to precisely indicate interrelationships between informational
assets. Also, it is an efficient means of extracting basic essential parameters of massively dense log data.
Fig. 3. Users’ device access network
V-A. Graph Parameters
The individual degree distribution is illustrated as a histogram in Figure 4. The degree of a user is the number
of devices a user access in this analysis. This figure reveals that the majority of users have a lower degree while
the minority of users have the larger degree compared to others. We can think of two possible reasons behind
the few number of users in the tail of the distribution. Either these employees are assigned to multiple devices to
perform their day to day operations or an anomalous behavior. As previously mentioned, we should not directly
conclude any of the insiders in the tail of the distribution as suspicious just by looking at the number of devices
11
Fig. 4. Degree distribution of users
they accessed. However, we can think them as high-risk profiles among the others.
V-B. Subgraph Parameters
Figure 5(a) illustrates the histogram of vertex count for the different order of user subgraphs. These histograms
show the majority of users have a small number of vertices in their subgraphs while the minority of users have a
larger number of vertices in their subgraphs resulting much complex user subgraphs. Figure 5(b) is an illustration of
the distribution of edge count across the different order of subgraphs. These values also follow a distribution which
is very similar to vertex count. The subgraph density and the weighted diameter for all USGs also shown in figure
5(c) and figure 5(d) respectively. Density histograms show a similar pattern for most of the cases. Even though we
could not find any obvious reason for this nature of distribution, we think that subgraph density is an important
attribute for this kind of evaluations. Therefore, we continued to use that parameter as an input for the ADU.
Diameter distribution for lower order subgraphs shows similar behavior with a single peak data bar while higher
order subgraphs show similar behavior with two distinct peaks. These peaks are an indication of cluster/clusters
of users who have similar behavioral patterns. The other subgraph property, number of peers also indicates two
broader groups of users corresponds to two significant data bars and few other small groups of users. These results
indicate the significance of higher order subgraph analysis in finding little clues among the enormous amount of
data.
V-C. Time Dependent Parameters
This subsection discusses the results obtained for other time-varying properties, which were identified as some
of the other governing parameters of insider threat problem.
V-C1. Individual Logon-Logoff Behavior. Figure 6(a) is an illustration of users logon behavior for the entire
period of the dataset. By looking at this graph, it is evident that the majority of logon activities occur during
early office hours, which can be interpreted as the first logon event of the day. There are some other logon events,
especially when we consider the “maximum” logon time which occurs during regular working hours, which can be
treated as logins followed by screen locks during the day. The logon times which we need to pay more attention are
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Fig. 5. Histograms of subgraph properties
the events which happen during after office hours. We can identify a few users who have minimum and maximum
logon times occurred during the late night, which might be unusual for normal operations. In real world enterprise
networks, we can expect system user logon activities during this type of time periods for scheduled jobs such as
backups, log rotations and routine activities. But if we find such logon activities for non-system users, that is for
human users, it needs to be further investigated to differentiate between a genuine or a suspicious activity.
One of the other critical parameters of insider threat detection, the “logoff” behavior of users are illustrated in
Figure 6(b). This graph also shows the mean, mode, minimum and maximum logoff times of each user for the
entire period. As can be seen on the graph majority of “logoff” events happen during late office hours. As in the
case of “logon” behavior we are concern about after hours logoff events which are abnormal compared to the
majority events happen during regular business hours.
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Fig. 6. Users’ logon and logoff behavior
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(a) USB connect
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00
03:00:00
04:00:00
05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00
08:00:00
09:00:00
10:00:00
11:00:00
12:00:00
13:00:00
14:00:00
15:00:00
16:00:00
17:00:00
18:00:00
19:00:00
20:00:00
21:00:00
22:00:00
23:00:00
00:00:00
AH
M
04
10
AJ
D0
07
4
BB
S0
42
2
BI
S0
24
7
BJ
M
01
11
CE
J0
10
9
CI
M
02
71
D
IB
00
81
D
IB
02
85
D
LM
00
51
D
M
K0
25
7
D
PM
04
23
ES
H0
28
3
FT
M
04
06
G
KO
00
78
H
AD
02
46
H
BO
04
13
H
CM
02
67
H
M
M
01
08
H
PH
00
75
H
R
B0
35
1
H
W
W
04
36
IIW
02
49
IJ
M
04
44
JM
K0
09
9
KW
E0
08
2
LO
M
00
86
M
KW
04
41
M
O
H0
27
3
N
D
M
04
17
N
M
S0
28
0
N
W
T0
09
8
PP
F0
43
5
R
D
T0
42
4
R
SC
00
89
R
SM
02
77
XA
A0
10
4
user
Ti
m
e
variable
max
mean
min
mode
(b) USB disconnect
0
10
20
AH
M
04
10
AJ
D0
07
4
BB
S0
42
2
BI
S0
24
7
BJ
M
01
11
CE
J0
10
9
CI
M
02
71
D
IB
00
81
D
IB
02
85
D
LM
00
51
D
M
K0
25
7
D
PM
04
23
ES
H0
28
3
FT
M
04
06
G
KO
00
78
H
AD
02
46
H
BO
04
13
H
CM
02
67
H
M
M
01
08
H
PH
00
75
H
R
B0
35
1
H
W
W
04
36
IIW
02
49
IJ
M
04
44
JM
K0
09
9
KW
E0
08
2
LO
M
00
86
M
KW
04
41
M
O
H0
27
3
N
D
M
04
17
N
M
S0
28
0
N
W
T0
09
8
PP
F0
43
5
R
D
T0
42
4
R
SC
00
89
R
SM
02
77
XA
A0
10
4
user
co
u
n
t variable
MAX
MODE
(c) USB file transfer statistics
Differnce between Maximum and Mode number of File Copies
N
um
be
r o
f U
se
rs
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
5
10
15
20
17
8
4
2
0
2
0
2 2
(d) Difference between maximum and mode number of USB
file transfers
Fig. 7. Removable media usage behavior
V-C2. Removable media usage. Figure 7 is an illustration of users’ removable media usage statistics. Similar to
logon/logoff analysis, time dependencies of removable media usage has also been investigated. Figure 7(a) and (b)
shows the maximum, minimum, mean and mode times for USB connect and disconnect events respectively. One
important factor noticed through this analysis is only a 20% (37/129) of employees from the selected designation
used USB file copies, which can not be considered as a typical behavioral pattern among the chosen group. In this
case also events which occur during regular office hours can be regarded as normal while events happened after
hours can be either suspicious or work related. Also, we have to be vigilant about large file copying during after
hours as well as normal business hours. This property can be yield by analysis of the time gap between consecutive
connect and disconnect events, which we have not computed in this exercise. Figure 7(c) and (d) demonstrate the
variation of users daily number of file accesses. To identify suspicious file copies we have considered only the
maximum and mode of the number of file copies per day by an individual. If the difference between the maximum
and the mode of the number of file copies is unusual, it can be considered as a suspicious file download. By looking
at the histogram, it is clear that the above difference is less than four for the majority of employees while a few of
the users deviated from this pattern.
Web Access Patterns. For the completeness of this work, we have selected a single parameter, based on individual
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users’ web access patterns. Distribution of the unique number of URLs accessed by individual users is illustrated
in Figure 8. This results also illustrate few outliers from rest of the group, which can be directed for further
investigations. We will be exploring the means of integration of our previous work [9] to get more input parameters
based on web access patterns in the continuation of this work.
Fig. 8. Distribution of unique URLs accessed by users
V-D. Anomaly Detection
Figure 9(a) illustrates the anomaly score distribution of the user base for the different order of subgraphs and
the combination of all subgraph properties. Anomaly score distribution clearly indicates major two types of users
based on the above-proposed subgraph properties. The users in the tail of the distribution have small anomaly score
values, and they do not change with the order of subgraph. However, the other set of users who are in the main
segment of the distribution have higher anomaly scores and vary based on the order of subgraph. Based on the
Isolation Forest algorithm, users with anomalous scores very close to 1 can be considered as definite anomalies
while the instances with anomaly scores much smaller than 0.5 are safe to consider as typical cases.
V-E. Parameter Dependency
Figure 9(b) is an indication of how the anomaly scores are distributed on different input parameters chosen
in this analysis. The dense graph indicated few points above the “Red” color horizontal line which is equivalent
to an anomaly score of 0.8. Users belong to those points can be considered as anomalous users. To get a better
understanding of results illustrated in Figure 9(b), the distribution of users with respect to anomaly scores computed
based on all identified parameters is shown as a histogram in Figure 10. We find that the majority of users have
anomaly scores in the interval [0.4, 0.7], which can be considered to be normal, while a minority of users have
anomaly score values above 0.7 which can be regarded as suspicious. The single outlier with anomaly score value
higher than 0.8 can be tagged for further investigations.
In the case of insider threat detection and prevention, the priority is on the isolation of suspicious users from the
rest of workforce. Since it was the major intention of this work, we have used the following technique to validate
above results by computing the percentage of suspicious users based on the different parameters identified. To
perform that, the calculated anomaly scores are mapped into a binary vector (0, 1) based on a predefined threshold
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Fig. 9. Anomaly score distribution
value for each parameter. The threshold value for each parameter is selected as the (maximum value − 0.1),
keeping a margin of 10% as in most of the experimental cases. In the particular case of anomaly scores of ≈ 0.5
for the entire dataset, we will exclude that parameter in the validation process as that parameter do not contribute
much in finding suspicious activities. For all the other cases anomaly scores are mapped as described above. We
propose the following two methods to check parameter dependencies as discussed below.
Case I : In this approach percentage of suspicious users are calculated considering the predicted number of
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anomalous parameters at a time from 1 to 6. Calculated percentages are summarized in Table 4. Calculated
percentage values reveal more than 79% of users can be considered to have normal behavior, while the others
have suspicious behavior. Also noted there are no users who are suspicious when considered more than three
parameters together. The complex nature of insider threat problem can govern this type of results.
Case II : In this method, we proposed looking at the all possible combinations of parameters from the six
main categories selected for this analysis. After considering the results of above Case I, we could not expect a
significant change in results. However, we believe this would be a possible approach in identification of parameter
dependencies.
TABLE IV
STATISTICS ON PARAMETER DEPENDENCY
Functional unit Department
Percentage of Users Corresponds to Number of Anomalous Parameters (%)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Research And Engineering Engineering 83.72 16.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Research And Engineering Software Management 82.18 15.84 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
Research And Engineering Research 79.21 17.82 2.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fig. 10. Anomaly score distribution of users
VI. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced a framework based on graphical and anomaly detection approaches for
identifying potential malicious insiders. This model generates anomaly scores based on different input parameters
for each user. Considering the nature of insider attacks a user can be deemed to be suspicious even if a single
parameter has been found to be suspicious. We have adopted graph, subgraph properties and statistical methods
in generating input parameters for the anomaly detection algorithm through multi-domain real world information.
Empirical results reveal the importance of selected properties in combating this patient and smart attack. We also
found that more than 79% of users with common behavioral patterns while the rest of the group shows suspicious
behavior based on different parameters. Users belong to the minority group can be tagged and directed for further
investigation.
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In the continuation of this work, we will focus on integrating as many as possible input parameters to improve
the effectiveness of the proposed framework. It would include social network data which can be considered as a
good source of online behavior and other statistical inputs from email and instant messaging communications. We
believe this framework would be much more useful if we can include data from content analysis of other sources
such as websites access by users, emails sent/received by users and file transfers to removable media. We will focus
on integrating several other graphical parameters, few other statistical parameters such as time gap between USB
insert/remove actions in expanding this framework. Also, we will explore the possibilities of integration of similarity
based clustering mechanism which we have introduced in our previous work for web access pattern analysis [9],
with the proposed model. Another focus is on extending the analysis for the entire dataset and validate results with
the 2 insider threat cases simulated in the dataset. The other main aspect we are looking towards is the use of
temporal properties in graph analysis to incorporate time factor instead of statistical analysis. Finally, the main goal
of this work, as well as our previous and future work is to formulate an efficient, scalable and automated insider
threat detection and prediction framework.
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